SANKARA AND BUDDHISM

Here are the views of Bhagavatpadal on Buddhism:

Shankara and Buddhism - 1

By Sri Kamakoti Mandali on Aug 17, 2009 | In Darshana

- Govinda Chandra Pandey

The relationship of Shankara to Buddhism has been the subject of considerable debate since ancient times. He has been hailed as the arch critic of Buddhism and the principal architect of its downfall in India. At the same time, he has been described as a Buddhist in disguise. Both these opinions have been expressed by ancient as well as modern authors – scholars, philosophers, historians and sectaries. Shankara’s writings clearly show his acquaintance with at least three schools of Buddhist philosophy, the sarvAstivAdins, the vijnAnavAdins and the mAdhyamikas. Of individual Buddhist authors, he clearly shows acquaintance with dharmakIrti. He criticizes Buddhist doctrines and speaks disparagingly of the Buddha himself. These facts tend to lend evidence to the legendary accounts in his biographies which show him disputing with Buddhists.

Although shankara’s criticism of Buddhist philosophy occurs in several of his works, it is taken up most systematically in sUtra bhAShya. Following the sUtras he takes up for criticism the common Buddhist ideas of momentariness, non-selfhood and causality as dependent origination, as also some specific doctrines of the three Buddhist schools mentioned before. Now the Buddhist principle of momentariness implies that all things are subject to change, that change takes place every moment, and that all change implies total destruction without any room for survival or persistence (niranvayavinAsha). In its fully developed form at the hands of Buddhist logicians this principle was grounded on the analysis of the concept of existence itself and formulated as a svabhAvAnumAna. Existence was conceived as instantaneous causal function (artha-kriyAkAritva), causation as ordered succession of movements (nityaprAgbhAvitva), things as process or flow (santAna, pravAha). The principle had, however, originated in existential concern and passed through several phases. It was the perception of human mortality and the evanescence of experience which led to the disparagement of the attachment to personal existence. The denial of the individual soul as a permanent spiritual substance was developed as its metaphysical support and corollary. Individual existence, thus, came to be conceived as an aggregate, a stream of transient factors. In this earlier phase, the doctrine of momentariness was essentially a doctrine of the transience of psychic states without any permanent substratum. It did not mean in this early phase the unqualified denial of all substantive entities. Later when the Buddhist schools ramified, the concept of momentariness was formulated at least as early as the age of ashoka. It was elaborated in abhidharma and mahAvibhAsa and the abhidharmakosha record detailed debates on the nature of Time. In mahAyAnic texts the momentariness of things became the momentariness of the states of mind or experience. Logicians like ratnakIrti gave the doctrine its finished logical form.

The sarvAstivAdins to whom shankara alludes do admit a large number of dharms which function momentarily but subsist through time. This is what give them their very name. it is true that substance, quality and mode are rolled into one in the dharmas but they do have persistent natures or characters i.e. svabhAva or lakShaNa.

Now shankara’s major critique of momentariness occurs in the context of sarvAstivAda, apparently in its sautrAntic version. Shankara thus questions the doctrine of momentariness as inadequate to explain the facts of identity, especially personal identity, and the fact of causation itself. ‘Those who maintain that everything has a momentary existence only admit that when the thing existing in the second moment enters into being the thing existing in the first moment ceases to be. On this admission it is impossible to establish between the two things the relation of cause and effect, since the former momentary existence which ceases or has ceased to be, and so has entered into the state of non-existence, cannot be the cause of the later momentary existence’. Nor could it be assumed that the former momentary existence when its process has reached a mature conclusion and it is still in a positive state, is the cause of the later moment. This would imply that the finished positive product becomes active once again and gets connected with the next moment. Nor would it help to assume that the mere existence of the antecedent moment constitutes its causal efficiency because it still remains unconnected with the succeeding moment. If the nature of the cause does not influence the nature of the effect, the two cannot be called cause and effect. If the nature of the cause persists in the effect, as that of clay in the pot, the principle of momentariness would be given up. If, on the other hand, the nature of the cause were to be assumed not to color the nature of the effect at all, one would be able to affirm the causal relation arbitrarily. Again, the production, and destruction of a thing being held to be simultaneous, how are they to be connected with its own nature or being? The three could not be identical, else the three terms would become synonymous. Nor could the three be distinguished as different states of the same thing because then one moment will in effect be trifurcated. Nor could the production and destruction of a thing be different from its being because in that case its being would be untouched by them and become perpetual. Nor finally could the production or destruction of a thing be merely their perception or non-perception which being subjective will leave the object untouched and make it eternal once again. Indeed, since the antecedent moment ceases before the rise of the subsequent one, the effect would appear to arise without a cause which would contradict the Buddhist belief in causality. If the antecedent moment is held to last till the subsequent moment arises, cause and effect would become simultaneous, and the principle of momentariness too would be falsified. In the brhadAraNyaka bhAShya too shankara attacks the concepts of production out of nothing and momentariness on several grounds. Recognition or the perception of similarity would both be impossible if everything is momentary.

Shankara’s critique of the Buddhist principle of momentariness here appears to be based on a dynamic conception of causality of which the paradigm may be said to be the case of intelligent will transforming some material according to a design. Such is God’s creation of the world (IkShApUrvaka srShTi) as also of the potter’s making of pots. Shankara essentially identifies cause and effect, regarding causation as nothing but transformation. The Buddhist view in contrast resolves causality into the invariance of succession where the cause is devoid of any motion or influence. The Buddhist model of causation is not the production of commonsense objects like pots, but the infinitesimal process of becoming, as illustrated in the stream of consciousness.

As for shankara’s difficulties about the reconciliation of the three aspects of becoming in a single moment, this difficulty was raised and considered at length in the abhidharma. The sautrAntika answer was that the samskrta lakShaNas belong to the sequence or pravAha. Static commonsense objects need to be replaced by continuous processes or flux. The identity of an object is defined by its characteristic function which must express itself instantaneously and cease. As a new function emerges a new object must be held to have been produced. However, the indiscernibility of similar successive moments and functions leads to a sense of persistent identity in sequence. While Buddhist momentariness reduces identity into an illusory construct, shankara views change as illusory modes or appearances of the changeless ground. For the Buddhist, ‘to be’ is ‘to change’; for shankara, ‘to change’ is the sign of being unreal. Shankara ridicules the Buddhists as vainAshikas or Nihilists, the Buddhists disparage vedAnta as shAsvatavAda or Eternalism. Thus Buddhism and Shankara appear to be mutually opposed as asadvAda and sadvAda.

This, however, does not represent the true position. The Buddha had expressly ruled out both Eternalism (shAshvatavAda) and Nihilism (ucChedavAda). Hence to accuse his doctrine of Nihilism could only be based on misunderstanding